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Abstract
Background: Star defined infrastructure as something other things “run on”; it consists mainly of “boring things.” Building on
her classic 1999 paper, and acknowledging contemporary developments in technologies, services, and systems, we developed a
new theorization of health information infrastructure with five defining characteristics: (1) a material scaffolding, backgrounded
when working and foregrounded upon breakdown; (2) embedded, relational, and emergent; (3) collectively learned, known, and
practiced (through technologically-supported cooperative work and organizational routines); (4) patchworked (incrementally
built and fixed) and path-dependent (influenced by technical and socio-cultural legacies); and (5) institutionally supported and
sustained (eg, embodying standards negotiated and overseen by regulatory and professional bodies).
Objective: Our theoretical objective was, in a health care context, to explore what information infrastructure is and how it
shapes, supports, and constrains technological innovation. Our empirical objective was to examine the challenges of implementing
and scaling up video consultation services.
Methods: In this naturalistic case study, we collected a total of 450 hours of ethnographic observations, over 100 interviews,
and about 100 local and national documents over 54 months. Sensitized by the characteristics of infrastructure, we sought examples
of infrastructural challenges that had slowed implementation and scale-up. We arranged data thematically to gain familiarity
before undertaking an analysis informed by strong structuration, neo-institutional, and social practice theories, together with
elements taken from the actor-network theory.
Results: We documented scale-up challenges at three different sites in our original case study, all of which relate to “boring
things”: the selection of a platform to support video-mediated consultations, the replacement of desktop computers with virtual
desktop infrastructure profiles, and problems with call quality. In a fourth subcase, configuration issues with licensed
video-conferencing software limited the spread of the innovation to another UK site. In all four subcases, several features of
infrastructure were evident, including: (1) intricacy and lack of dependability of the installed base; (2) interdependencies of
technologies, processes, and routines, such that a fix for one problem generated problems elsewhere in the system; (3) the inertia
of established routines; (4) the constraining (and, occasionally, enabling) effect of legacy systems; and (5) delays and conflicts
relating to clinical quality and safety standards.
Conclusions: Innovators and change agents who wish to introduce new technologies in health services and systems should: (1)
attend to materiality (eg, expect bugs and breakdowns, and prioritize basic dependability over advanced functionality); (2) take
a systemic and relational view of technologies (versus as an isolated tool or function); (3) remember that technology-supported
work is cooperative and embedded in organizational routines, which are further embedded in other routines; (4) innovate
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incrementally, taking account of technological and socio-cultural legacies; (5) consider standards but also where these standards
come from and what priorities and interests they represent; and (6) seek to create leeway for these standards to be adapted to
different local conditions.
(J Med Internet Res 2019;21(12):e16093)  doi: 10.2196/16093
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Introduction
Background
It has been 20 years since Star defined infrastructure as
something other things “run on” and proposed nine defining
characteristics: embeddedness, transparency, reach or scope,
learned as part of membership, links with conventions of
practice, embodiment of standards, built on an installed base,
becomes visible on breakdown and fixed in modular increments
[1,2]. The information infrastructure for health care needs to
satisfy multiple use cases, such as personal health management,
health care delivery (including assuring the quality and safety
of care, audits, and billing), public health, research [3], and the
formation of the scaffolding for a learning health system [4].
Sittig et al observed that this infrastructure consists not only of
hardware and software but also the language of clinical
applications, a human-computer interface, people who interact
with it (including developers, support staff, staff-users, and
patient-users), internal organizational features (eg, environment,
policies, procedures, and culture), external rules and regulations,
and the measures and metrics with which it is monitored [5].
In this paper, we seek to synthesize and extend these earlier
theorizations. We begin by describing the clinical,
organizational, and technical features of health care
infrastructure. We then outline some central concepts in critical
social science that inspired Star’s original work on infrastructure
before offering a new theorization of health information
infrastructure consisting of five key features. We illustrate this
with a detailed contemporary case study of how this
infrastructure influenced attempts to implement and scale up a
video consultation service. After discussing these findings, we
offer suggestions for those who seek to improve health services
by introducing infrastructural innovations.
An Overview of Health Information Infrastructure
Contemporary health care environments are saturated with
technologies, many of which are highly sophisticated. However,
health care infrastructure has a reputation for being convoluted,
conservative, failure-prone, and lacking integration, for
numerous interacting reasons [6-8]. Health care is complex,
patients are unique, and the pace of change is rapid; new devices,
procedures, service models, and policies are continually
emerging, rendering elements of existing infrastructure obsolete.
Safety (including the maxim “first, do no harm”) is an overriding
concern, reflected in stringent design requirements and
regulatory standards. A high proportion of clinical encounters
are exceptions (ie, they deviate from the base case); technologies
that assume an uncomplicated patient with a single, textbook
condition and over-specify tasks and processes tend to be too
brittle to support clinical work. Integration between specialties
and sectors is expected but usually proves elusive, partly because
it tends to be framed in technical and logistical (rather than
socio-political) terms.
Health information infrastructure typically has hybrid roots,
with incremental additions funded variously by local (public or
private) providers, government, commercial suppliers, publicly
funded research, and philanthropic sources [3,6]. It requires an
exceptionally high level of security, reliability, and
interoperability, and the resources to support repairs and
developments to it (eg, redesigning routines and appointing and
retraining staff). For all these reasons, the value proposition for
heavy/traditional information technology (IT) (core,
slow-moving, remote from a customer or patient [9]) in health
care may be adverse, and the infrastructure supporting health
care systems may be weak and fragmented. Some commercial
suppliers prefer to focus on the more agile and less risky,
customer-facing light/digital IT (including the growing wellness
and wearables market).
In the United Kingdom, an advanced information infrastructure
has emerged to support the public sector, nonprofit National
Health Service (NHS) through in-house development, and a
variety of contractual arrangements with different commercial
suppliers [10]. Recent technological advances have made new
service models possible, such as a commercially driven
“doctor-in-your-pocket” video consultation service accessible
via a smartphone app (which, controversially, bypasses much
of the traditional NHS infrastructure) [11].
The Critical Social Science of Information
Infrastructure
Star was a cofounder of the “Society for People Interested in
the Study of Boring Things” [2]. By this, she meant lists,
classification schemes, ordering devices (eg, timetables), and
the wires and connections that make an information system
work. Many of these “boring things” inscribe the values,
expectations, conflicts, and power relations of particular groups
in society [2,12]. Developing standards, for example, is a social
and political (ie, value-laden and power-charged) process in
which a more-or-less agreed-upon version of the world is
constructed and negotiated [13,14].
Star proposed that ethnographers can learn a lot by exploring
how “boring” infrastructure plays out in real-world settings
[1,2]. A primary focus of such work is the ever-present tension
between the general (standardized) and the local (situated),
which people attempt to bridge through articulation or tinkering
(the steps taken to get things done as work unfolds in real-time,
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despite material limitations, regulatory constraints, imperfect
data, conflicting priorities, reluctant colleagues, etc) [15], and
via boundary objects (things that are differently interpreted and
used by different groups, while retaining a shared sense of what
the object is) [16].
As Berg and Timmermans have pointed out, the universal
aspects of information infrastructure are not preexisting [17].
Instead, they need to be codeveloped through dialogue among
those who will use, or be affected by, the infrastructure [17]:
…disorder preexists and precedes the emergence of
order. The phoenix of universality rises from the ashes
of local chaos. In the structure of these accounts, the
local is the generic, natural state that is subsequently
transformed; it is the unquestioned base from which
the analysis starts.
Not only is order more arbitrary than is often assumed, suggest
Berg and Timmermans, but any creation of order in one part of
the system will create disorder somewhere else [17]. Because
of this, the scaling up of a technology-supported service model
to new settings is likely to be an unexpectedly tricky process
and one that will not be easy to research, since ethnographic
methods cannot be easily applied across multiple settings
[18,19]. In sum, the health information infrastructure in many
countries is characterized by state of the art individual
technologies which need to interface with (but have often been
designed with little awareness of) a legacy infrastructure and
restrictive regulatory standards, all in the context of a complex,
fast-changing, unpredictable, and underfunded service
environment.
A New Theorization of Health Information
Infrastructure
Overview
In this section, we outline our theorization of health information
infrastructure, which adapts and extends original work by Star
[1,2] and subsequent scholars [3,5,6]. It consists of five essential
characteristics, listed below.
A Material Scaffolding, Backgrounded When Working
and Foregrounded Upon Breakdown
What Star called the installed base of infrastructure comprises
both hardware and software as well as the rooms, desks, tunnels,
pipes, and other things that host it. It is typically large and
extensive (eg, allowing communication at a distance), but tends
to drift into the background as it provides the mundane means
to the ends of an organization, and because significant parts of
it are buried, kept in a back office, or found in the cloud. To the
familiar user, infrastructure is what Star called transparent (in
the computer science sense of being invisible, taken for granted,
and ready to hand). It does not have to be reinvented each time,
but it becomes visible on breakdown (such as when a server
crashes or a software upgrade reveals a bug) [2]. Breakdown in
this context can also mean situations where the material or
nonmaterial features of infrastructure prove too inflexible to
allow a clinician to exercise autonomy to deliver care.
Embedded, Relational, and Emergent
Star observed that infrastructure is “sunk into, and inside of,
other structures, social arrangements and technologies” [2]. She
considered infrastructure a fundamentally relational concept,
becoming real in relation to organized practices. Organizational
knowing (the knowledge on which members draw when
deciding how to act) is, to a large extent, tacit and embodied
[20]. It draws on shared schemas and practices but also the
material scaffolding of buildings, rooms, computers, records,
charts, and other aspects of infrastructure [21]. The medical
record, for example, is best conceptualized not as an isolated
and static container of data but as a dynamic, evolving map of
what is, was, and will be happening to the patient; this record
links to other human and technological actors and to documents
and practices [7]. This relational network evolves dynamically
over time.
Collectively Learned, Known, and Practiced
Organizational work is complicated. It involves multiple actors
who must share an understanding of context (primarily which
technical and sociocultural actions are possible, allowable, and
required) [22]. Such knowledge is built through collective
learning and sensemaking, and it becomes embedded through
both hard (eg, protocols or algorithms) and soft (eg,
organizational routines, processes, practices, and norms)
mechanisms. Indeed, organizational work can be conceptualized
as multiple collective routines that are embedded within, and
influenced by, one another; they are supported by shared
material artifacts and social expectations that either harmonize
or create conflict [23].
Maniatopoulos et al, drawing on Bourdieu and Schatzki, used
the term “field of practice” to describe the nexus of
interconnected and interdependent practices and arrangements,
distributed across social, cultural, and material orders, that form
the context for organizational work in a health care setting [24].
Infrastructure, according to Star, embodies such fields of
practice and is learned as a part of membership [2]. The
relationship between the physical (material) and
knowledge/practice (nonmaterial) features of infrastructure is
interdependent and reciprocal, as each shapes and is shaped by
the other [24,25]. Both aspects of infrastructure, in turn, need
to be differentiated from the purposive content of the interactions
and practices they enable. A video consultation, for example,
relies on infrastructure to provide its conditions of possibility,
but the consultation itself also has its sui generis content intrinsic
to its purpose. The conditions of possibility that the
infrastructure provides will be more or less adequate to the
clinician’s view of this purpose.
Patchworked and Path-Dependent
Hanseth and Monteiro described infrastructure as “a layered
patchwork of components and associated routines which emerge
historically” [26]. It is rarely installed or replaced wholescale,
and it cannot be fixed all at once or globally. New components
are continually added, and they must be designed for backward
compatibility with existing components. Importantly, these
legacy components are not just technical. They contain
embedded standards and assumptions that reflect historical
J Med Internet Res 2019 | vol. 21 | iss. 12 | e16093 | p. 3http://www.jmir.org/2019/12/e16093/
(page number not for citation purposes)
Greenhalgh et alJOURNAL OF MEDICAL INTERNET RESEARCH
XSL•FO
RenderX
socio-cultural influences (eg, a drug ordering system that fails
to consider nurse prescribing because it was designed when
only doctors could prescribe). Legacy systems also reflect
historical strategic decisions (eg, to invest, or not, in bandwidth,
or to award an exclusive contract to a particular supplier), which
set an organization on a particular path from which it is difficult
to deviate. Because of such challenges, and because nobody is
really in charge of infrastructure, changes to it typically take
time and negotiation; they may involve substantial power
struggles and unanticipated financial costs, but they may
sometimes turn out to be impossible.
Institutionally Supported and Sustained
Institutional theorists distinguish between technical
environments, in which organizations produce a product or
service with a focus on effective and efficient performance, and
institutional environments, which are characterized by the need
to conform to particular rules and requirements to receive
legitimacy and support [27,28]. As March and Olsen put it,
“institutions reflect the routine way in which people do what
they are supposed to do” [29]. In institutional environments,
the technical components of the infrastructure are constructed
and connect in a highly standardized fashion. Asking questions
about which standards are used and where they came from can
surface a narrative about the roles of, and conflicts among,
societal macroactors, including government, industry,
professional bodies, and others [2].
Scott identifies three institutional pillars that operate with health
care: regulative (statutory and legal requirements/what we must
do), normative (professional norms, values, and definitions of
excellence/what we should do), and cultural-cognitive
(internalized scripts/what we unconsciously recognize as what
everyone does) [28]. The standards, norms, and scripts of a
particular health care system (eg, what is deemed safe,
medical-grade, evidence-based, high-quality, confidential, etc)
are enduring and hard to change, more so because they are
materially inscribed in infrastructure.
Aims, Objectives and Research Questions
Against this background, we sought to study health information
infrastructure in a contemporary case study of innovation and
change. Our theoretical objective was to explore, in the context
of a heavily institutionalized health care environment, what
infrastructure is, and how it influences technological innovation.
Our empirical objective was, in partnership with front-line
clinical and informatics staff at a self-proclaimed digital
innovator hospital trust, to explore the challenges of scaling up
a video consultation service across different clinical specialties
and spreading this model to other sites. Our research question
was: What was the nature of the infrastructure in this setting,
and how did it shape (and become shaped by) the
implementation of video consultations in different clinical and
geographical settings?
Methods
Study Design and Setting
This study is a naturalistic case study with an action research
component in Petroc Health (pseudonym), a UK hospital trust,
along with three other trusts (anonymized as Eastern, Southern,
and Northern), all of which are seeking to emulate the described
model. Data sources (summarized in Table 1) included
ethnographic field notes, interviews, documents, and material
artifacts.
Provenance, Management, and Governance of the
Research
This work incorporated and extended the VOCAL (Virtual
Online Consultations—Advantages and Limitations) study,
which ran from 2015 to 2017. Its methods [30] and findings
[31,32] (including details of ethics approval) have been
published previously. An extension study called “Scaling Up
VOCAL” began in 2017 with ethics approval from London
Riverside Research Ethics Committee (reference 19/LO/0550;
IRAS project ID 258679) and will complete in 2020.
In the early stages of this research, action research meetings
were held approximately every three months. However, as the
study progressed, these were incorporated into the trust’s
existing governance structures, including a Transforming
Services Together (TST) Outpatient Working Group, whose
goal was to drive improvements in outpatient care. In 2018, a
subcommittee of this group formed a Virtual Consultation Unit
to focus specifically on local scale-up and a broader spread of
video consultations. We supported these groups to articulate a
theory of change, collect and periodically review data on the
project’s progress, and amend ongoing plans and targets. The
work included developing resources and horizon-scanning wider
system issues and developments (eg, technology platforms,
national policies). The research was overseen by a steering
group with a lay chair and patient representation, and a separate
patient advisory group gave periodic feedback.
The constraints of infrastructure at the microlevel of the clinical
consultation have been described in previous papers [10,32].
For this paper, we focused primarily on efforts to achieve
translation by organizational actors at the meso level, that is, to
engage interest and mobilize other actors (human and
technological) to achieve the task of making video consultations
business as usual [33].
The Case
The leading case site, Petroc Health, is a large, multi-site acute
hospital trust and a recognized digital innovator, located in a
deprived and multi-ethnic part of London. At the time of this
study, NHS organizations were experiencing year-on-year
reductions in their budget at a time of rising need, worsening
staff shortages, and political and economic uncertainty. All
departments were under pressure to deliver services more
cost-effectively, and technologies were depicted, both nationally
and locally, to achieve this. Outpatient clinics at Petroc were
crowded, and there was huge pressure on the availability of
consulting rooms. Travel between the trust’s dispersed sites
was difficult and time-consuming. The did not attend rate for
some outpatient clinics exceeded 50%. Video consultations
were introduced initially to try to reduce did not attend rates,
though only some clinicians engaged with the new model, and
many patients were considered unsuitable for the video option
for clinical (eg, high-risk) or socio-cultural (eg, low health
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literacy) reasons [31,32]. A cyberattack in 2017 led to a
devastating and widely reported collapse of the trust’s
information system [34].
Eastern, Southern, and Northern NHS trusts, based in different
parts of England, had all approached Petroc intending to emulate
their virtual consultation service model in one or more clinics.
As part of the Scaling Up VOCAL project, members of the
Petroc team supported clinicians and managers in these trusts,
which presented different cases in terms of size, geography,
patient population, and use of digital technology.
Participants, Sampling, and Dataset
We followed the introduction of video consultations initially in
three clinical departments (diabetes, antenatal diabetes, and
cancer surgery) and subsequent attempts to roll this model out
to an additional ten departments in Petroc Health, including
hematology, endocrinology, rheumatology, and neurology, and
to a further six departments in the other three sites. Data were
collected at a macro level (eg, national stakeholder interviews,
policy documents), meso level (interviews, field notes, and
internal documents from organizational ethnography), and
microlevel (eg, observation and video-recording of clinical
consultations). The full dataset and its contribution to our
analysis and theorization are shown in Table 1.
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Table 1. Overview of multi-level data collection and analysis (including the earlier VOCAL study).
Higher-order categoriesFirst-order interpretationScaling Up VOCAL study
(2017-20)
VOCALa study
(2015-17)
Data level
Microlevel
study of virtual
consultations
and efforts to
deliver these on
a clinic-by-clin-
ic basis
•••• Institutional assumptions built into the
material and technological infrastruc-
ture (eg, about the capability of users,
access rights, costs and payments, pri-
vacy and consent laws, and nature of
clinical work)
What is said and done in
consultations, and the local
setting-up of video consulta-
tions
Analysis of design and
material properties of
five video technology
platforms used across
participating sites:
Adobe Connect, Skype
(consumer), Skype for
Business, Attend Any-
where, Microsoft
TEAMS.
30 videotaped
remote consulta-
tions
• 16 face-to-face
consultations
(field notes
linked to those)
• How technology influences
clinical work and how indi-
vidual agency influences
technology use, including
examples of paradoxes (eg,
a small change in technolo-
gy has a significant effect),
breakdown (where infras-
tructure becomes visible).
invisible work, and articula-
tion (eg, tinkering to deliver
a service despite local con-
tingencies)
• Internal social structures (habitus) of
clinicians, such as personal and profes-
sional codes, and perspectives on ill-
ness. Specific knowledge of particular
patients, and local system knowledge• Interviews and think
aloud observations us-
ing the technology
within six clinical ser-
vices (diabetes, en-
docrinology, hematolo-
gy, rheumatology, or-
thopedics, cancer).
• How the tension between standardiza-
tion and contingency plays out as
clinicians use technologies in clinical
care (or find they cannot use them as
anticipated)
Mesolevel
study of organi-
zational change
•••• How organizational values, traditions,
and routines (embodied in scripts)
change over time, and why they endure
Departmental-level case
studies of efforts to intro-
duce and mainstream a
video consultation service
Main site: 150 hours of
ethnographic observa-
tion, 23 interviews with
17 staff, activity, and
patient demographic
data for six participat-
ing clinics.
24 staff inter-
views
• 300 hours of
clinic observa-
tion
• Role of individual agency in both em-
bodying and challenging institutional
structures
• Human actors’ attempts at
translation (problematiza-
tion, interessement, enrol-
ment and mobilization [33])
• 16 trust-level
documents. • How the micropolitics of the institution-
al setting shapes and constrains an im-
plementation effort
•• Secondary sites: 20
hours of ethnographic
observation, 14 inter-
views with ten staff
Throughput
and demograph-
ic data (eg,
number and
percent of con-
sultations done
via video).
• How competing interests
and agendas played out in
each case study
Macrolevel
study of the
wider context
for introducing
video consult-
ing
•••• Institutional pillars which help sustain
traditional face-to-face modes of con-
sulting, including regulative (laws,
tariffs, standards), normative (eg, pro-
fessional, ethical codes and definitions
of excellence), and cultural-cognitive
(master-narratives of what a medical
consultation is and how to behave in
it)
Historical and policy
drivers for, and barriers to,
the introduction of video
consultations in UK’s Na-
tional Health Service
One further stakeholder
interview
48 stakeholder
interviews
• •50 national-lev-
el documents
from 2000-
2017 (including
policies, guid-
ance, and na-
tional-level an-
nouncements)
Ten additional policy
and guidance docu-
ments published 2017-
19 • Reasons for emergence of
alternative service models
involving video consulta-
tions (eg, in new models of
general practice)
• How these institutional pillars are in-
scribed in the National Health Service
information infrastructure
aVOCAL: Virtual Online Consultations—Advantages and Limitations.
Theoretical Framework
As described previously in our VOCAL publications [30-32],
and in common with Orlikowski [35] and Scott [28] (but in
contrast to actor-network theorists who prefer a flat ontology
[33]), we used a theoretical approach which assumes both
microactors (human and technological agents) and macroactors
(within broader social structures) who interact and coevolve in
a dynamic and recursive (mutually-influencing) way [36].
Stones’ adaptation of Giddens’ work in strong structuration
theory [37], and its extension by Greenhalgh and Stones to
include technologies [38] considers both external social
structures (such things as laws and regulations, societal and
professional norms, and socio-cultural expectations) and how
those structures are internalized as habitus by people (as
knowledge, acquired dispositions, experience, normative
orientations and morals, and patterns of learned behavior) and
by technologies (as encoded rules, standards, access controls,
and role assumptions). Teasing out these internalized social
structures helps us to theorize the different priorities and agendas
of different individuals, depending (for example) on their
professional allegiance, role and status in the organization, prior
training, experience, and so on.
J Med Internet Res 2019 | vol. 21 | iss. 12 | e16093 | p. 6http://www.jmir.org/2019/12/e16093/
(page number not for citation purposes)
Greenhalgh et alJOURNAL OF MEDICAL INTERNET RESEARCH
XSL•FO
RenderX
In deciding how to act in any social situation, human actors –
variously positioned within the configurations and hierarchies
of organizations – draw on both their habitus and on their
assessment of the here-and-now strategic terrain. There will
often be a tension between the generalized socio-cultural frames
of habitus and knowledge of the immediate field of practice.
Some actions will appear possible, expected, and required, while
some will seem impossible, inappropriate, or unimaginable.
Similarly, the internalized social structures of technologies will
(in some cases) extend what can be contemplated and achieved,
and (in other cases) place limits on what is possible.
Like actor-network theory, strong structuration theory envisages
humans and technologies as linked in dynamically evolving
networks, which are inherently unstable but can potentially
become stabilized when a particular configuration of people
and technologies becomes aligned. The institutional aspects of
health information infrastructures described above confer a high
degree of stability on them, meaning that introducing a
significant change to infrastructure requires substantial
realignment of people, technologies, standards, procedures,
training, incentives, and others. This process occurs in four
stages: problematization (defining a problem for which a
particular technology is a solution), interessement (getting others
to accept this problem-solution), enrolment (defining key roles
and practices in the network), and mobilization (engaging others
in fulfilling the roles, undertaking the practices and linking with
others) [33].
Analytic Approach
We took a two-stage approach to data analysis. First, we
analyzed interviews, documents, and field notes thematically
to gain familiarity and identify broad themes and categories.
Second, we used reflection and team discussion to undertake a
more theoretical analysis using technology-enhanced strong
structuration theory as a guiding framework. We sought to
identify macrostructures (Scott’s regulative, normative and
cultural-cognitive institutional pillars [28]), how these structures
were internalized within the habitus of human actors (as beliefs,
values, attitudes) and in technological actors (as algorithms,
access privileges, menus, quality of particular functions), and
how they shaped and constrained action in particular encounters
and events. We also considered how human actors sought,
successfully or unsuccessfully, to change and stabilize the
sociotechnical network in their effort to routinize and scale-up
video consultations.
To hone our focus on health information infrastructure, we
sought to construct rich ethnographic accounts of cases within
the case (such as recurring problems with bandwidth) that
illustrated and explored one or more of the five characteristics
of infrastructure set out above. We followed some guiding
principles of the ethnography of infrastructure suggested by
Star: surface master-narratives (the overarching discourses that
shape decisions), apply infrastructural inversion (eg, foreground
things that are usually kept in the background), surface invisible
work (eg, work done by low-grade staff such as secretaries and
administrators), and study paradoxes (eg, why a simple change
makes the whole system unworkable, perhaps because it
generates additional hidden work) [39]. We also built on Star’s
original approach to add a more specific institutional dimension
to the analysis, considering, for example, how institutional roles
and identities generated particular agendas and priorities and
showing how these agendas and priorities sometimes clashed.
We used narrative methods to organize our different data
elements into a coherent temporal account, which made sense
of unfolding actions and events in both a local and broader
context [40,41]. Narrativizing helped illuminate the unique and
subtle socio-technical interdependencies hidden within
technology-supported change programs [42] since the
significance of seemingly mundane or unrelated data items (eg,
a short exchange of emails, field notes from different clinics,
minutes of meetings held over months or years) often became
evident only when incorporated into a story that spanned both
time and space. This is especially true since infrastructural
problems typically took months or years, not days or weeks, to
resolve (and in many cases remained unresolved). The narrative
form also allowed us to tease out and emplot micropolitical
events and actions (such as how both conflicts and collaborations
emerged between clinical services and the IT department).
Results
Description of Dataset and Overview of Findings
Our final dataset (to date) of 450 hours of ethnographic
observation, 61 staff interviews, over 50 wider stakeholder
interviews, and a large body of documents (Table 1) was
characterized by a striking prominence of “boring things” [1,2],
such as small material details, protocols, standard operating
procedures, and seemingly banal rules and regulations.
Repeatedly, implementation and spread efforts were stalled or
distorted by things that were so mundane we initially hardly
noticed them. In the early months of our research, we
unconsciously backgrounded these “boring things” as our
research gaze was drawn to more conventional subjects of
ethnographic observation: the talk and action of human actors.
However, as the study unfolded, we recognized a recurring
pattern: human actors often found themselves unable to act in
a way that would have helped implement and spread the video
consultation model. It was when we began to explore the causes
of these delays and bottlenecks that the infrastructural themes
described in this paper began to emerge.
Below, we describe four examples of how infrastructural issues
repeatedly stalled this translational effort within Petroc Health
and the other provider organizations that were seeking to
emulate its video consultation model.
Selection of a Platform to Support Video-Mediated
Consultations
This subcase describes various challenges with four different
platforms that have been considered over the years for
supporting video consultations in Petroc Health. It illustrates
many of the features of infrastructure described in the
introduction, including the importance of its material features
and dependability, its embeddedness in systems and organized
practices, the incremental, patchworked, and path-dependent
way it is built and added to, the close interdependency of
technical components and standards (eg, the need for top
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management endorsement that its components are approved,
safe, and formally supported by the information and
communication technologies [ICT] department), and the
micropolitical nature of software choices (especially how senior
management is minded to reject what clinicians see as a more
patient-centered platform because it is less compliant with
regulatory standards).
Video consultations were first piloted in the diabetes clinic in
2011 by a consultant diabetologist, anonymized as TW. A
commercial videoconferencing tool, Adobe Connect (Adobe,
San Jose, California, United States), was initially used because
the project funder (NHS Choices, part of the English Department
of Health) had already obtained these licenses. Like most
corporate videoconferencing tools, Adobe Connect required a
host to set up a conference call slot using a calendar schedule.
It also offered session recording, instant messaging, and screen
sharing (intended for presentations). The trust’s ICT department
were reassured by the program’s end-to-end encryption and the
company’s security credentials. Clinicians chose not to use the
video-recording function, and the consultations were not
captured on the patient’s electronic record except via
conventional clinical notes. Screen-sharing was occasionally
used to show patients on-screen data, such as test results.
Adobe Connect’s video connection was technically reliable but
fraught with difficulties. For example, the need to invite patients
to a conference meeting by sending a URL link added a layer
of administrative overhead (hidden work) for the clinician. The
software was unfamiliar to both clinician and patient, and it
used a metaphor (conference room) that jarred with the
institutional purpose of the call (a confidential medical
consultation). While the new video consultation service was
popular with patients and staff, the platform was not.
Accordingly, the diabetes team tried using the consumer version
of Skype (Skype Communications S.A.R.L., Luxembourg City,
Luxembourg) as part of a one-year feasibility study funded by
the Health Foundation, a large medical charity. This decision
proved to be more popular. Many patients already used Skype,
and the rest generally knew someone who could show them
how to download and use the platform. In 2013, the team
obtained further funding from the same organization to explore
the use of Skype-based consultations in routine care. Unlike
Adobe Connect, Skype is an open-ended, point-to-point, video
call application that allows users to customize the structure of
the interaction. In addition to booking video consultations, it
allowed patients to see when the clinician was online and send
them an instant message. This was a function that was seen as
empowering patients who had been reluctant to attend clinic:
The advantage of seeing who is around is useful for
us – it has allowed a lot of ad hoc contacts with
patients who never turn up physically to clinics, but
Skype the nurse to say “Hi – saw you were online and
wanted to check this with you.” This has contributed
significantly to patient engagement with the service
and them taking control. [TW]
By 2015, Skype consultations had become business as usual in
TW’s diabetes clinic. However, our ethnographic observations
showed that this apparent embedding was the result of elaborate
workarounds by clinical and administrative staff for aligning
the clinical consultation with documenting attendance and
booking a repeat appointment. In a regular consultation, this
would have been triggered by the patient physically appearing
at the booking desk. This finding illustrated the deep
embeddedness of the clinical routine within other, more
administrative routines [23].
The Skype demonstration project described above had been
informally supported by the ICT department (who had installed
Skype on outpatient computers as a favor to TW, who was
well-liked). The project was popular and widely highlighted
(the UK Secretary of State for Health, for example, used it as
an example of digital innovation in high-profile speeches [43]).
However, efforts to roll out this model to other departments
within Petroc Health quickly stalled when senior management
raised concerns about the technical and regulatory implications
of using the consumer version of Skype. They pointed out the
lack of information governance rules or guidance on the use of
Skype within the NHS, the absence of service level agreements
or protocols for managing installation and upgrading of the
software, and the unknown local impact of video streaming on
network connectivity. The practical impact of the absence of
agreed standards and procedures was that, for example, a
clinician would arrive to do a booked video clinic and find that
because of a forced upgrade overnight, Skype no longer worked
on the local terminal. This reflected the fact that some aspects
of the infrastructure were controlled by players outside the
organization, such as Microsoft. This problem could be fixed
only when the clinician could cajole someone from the ICT
department into attending in person and manually overriding
the block.
TW used her experience, skill, and personal qualities to work
through Latour’s four stages of translation in her effort to
transform and stabilize the socio-technical network needed to
make video consultations a reality: problematization (defining
the problem as accessibility of services and a particular
technological intervention as the solution to this), interessement
(getting others to accept this problem-solution, specifically by
engaging top management and board members as well as her
fellow clinicians), enrolment (defining key roles and practices
in the network, such as establishing a cross-departmental
working group that included ICT and business elements), and
mobilization (engaging others in fulfilling the roles, maintaining
dialogue, and creative troubleshooting).
As part of our action research, we helped produce the
standardized procedures and documentation demanded (and
subsequently approved) by senior management at Petroc Health.
This, along with TW’s perseverance, led to Skype eventually
being formally approved for running video consultations across
the trust, which was a victory over the reluctant senior
management. In 2017, its rollout formed part of the
Transforming Services Together program. This strategic-level
initiative was coincidentally given a boost because upgrades to
some parts of the trust’s internet network were occurring as part
of a separate initiative to support multidisciplinary team
meetings between different sites using a different
video-conferencing technology. This serendipitous event
illustrates that infrastructure, as defined by Star, is a
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fundamentally relational concept, the reciprocal embeddedness
of infrastructural elements, and the patchworked and
path-dependent way in which the installed base evolves.
By the end of 2017, various additional videoconferencing
applications had become available, some of which had been
purpose-designed for medical use, and Skype was coming to
be outdated and limited in comparison. Initially, there was little
appetite by the project leads to replace Skype as the preferred
platform, as they felt that after much effort, they had secured
the necessary changes for supporting this particular software
(the standard operating procedures and information governance
approvals, for example, were specific to Skype).
However, during 2018, the trust encountered several technical
problems running Skype (described further in subcases 2 and
3) and began to consider moving to a different platform. There
was much discussion about the possibility of switching to the
licensed version of Skype, Skype for Business, which at the
time was the package of choice recommended by NHS Digital.
Eventually, however, a trust-level decision was made to pilot
Microsoft TEAMS (Microsoft, Redmond, Washington, United
States) (a workplace collaboration tool with video call
functionality), on the basis that this would form part of the
Microsoft Office 365 package, which the ICT department was
already planning to purchase on behalf of the trust (another
example of the emergent, patchworked, and path-dependent
nature of the installed base). Furthermore, our stakeholder
interviews with Microsoft executives had revealed a plan to
adapt the TEAMS software for clinical settings, including video
consultations, and their plans to integrate this function with
other parts of the electronic record. From May 2018, a series
of meetings occurred between Petroc Health’s top management
and Microsoft until a third-party broker organization was
contracted to negotiate and mediate formal agreements.
During the same period, the project team became aware of
another technology platform, Attend Anywhere (Attend
Anywhere, Melbourne, Australia), which was purpose-built for
clinical use. It had a design focus on emulating clinic workflows
(eg, a single button on the trust website enabled patients to gain
access to a virtual waiting room, potentially managed by a
receptionist, for the patient to be joined virtually by the clinician
when ready). Attend Anywhere had been developed by an
Australian SME and was already being implemented in several
sites in Scotland. In May 2018, Attend Anywhere was procured
centrally by NHS Improvement to pilot within selected NHS
trusts in England.
Petroc Health volunteered to be one of these pilot sites, creating
an opportunity to explore and evaluate both Attend Anywhere
and Microsoft TEAMS in parallel, and work out the business
case for these two very different options (one custom-designed
for this purpose but requiring purchase of additional licenses
after the pilot period; the other a product that was free as part
of a wider package but would need extensive customizing). At
the time of writing, the Attend Anywhere versus TEAMS pilot
is ongoing.
The Introduction of Virtual Desktop Infrastructure
Technology
Our next subcase describes how a technology (virtual desktop
infrastructure [VDI]) introduced with the goal of improving
efficiency and security through a standardized, lean (thin client),
and centrally-controlled process led to both anticipated
consequences (greater central oversight and control of local
activity, some efficiency improvements for the IT department)
and unanticipated ones (local breakdowns and knock-on
problems elsewhere in the system). For poorly understood
reasons (a hoped-for panopticon view never materialized), the
Skype video consultation platform became unreliable and lost
safety-critical audit-trail data, such as text messages and missed
calls. At one point, the video consultation service could only
be sustained through a single legacy terminal in one room that
entirely bypassed the modern VDI solution. As Star predicted,
this paradox proved revealing.
During 2016, the rollout of virtual clinics using Skype as part
of the trust’s Transforming Services Together program, helped
by a strongly positive national policy context, was primarily
driven by TW, who had introduced the model in her clinic back
in 2011. As part of this initiative, Skype had been made
accessible on clinic computers for approved services that had
been brought into the rollout initiative. Because of pushback
from the overstretched IT department (who required more
resources and wanted clear governance processes established
before agreeing to a full scale-up), it was otherwise not
supported on trust computers. By mid-2017, ten video
consultation services were approved across Petroc’s five hospital
sites.
At around the same time, many of the hospital computers
(referred to by the ICT department as fat clients) in Petroc’s
main central London site were being replaced with VDI units
(thin clients). VDI is a virtualization technology that hosts a
desktop operating system on a centralized server; the user’s
VDI profile can be customized and run on any machine within
the organization. The VDI deployment was a significant
undertaking, with plans to cover all five hospital sites over three
years. It was seen by ICT leads as a way of improving network
efficiency, security, and cost-effectiveness, as well as providing
clinical staff with a more consistent computer experience when
working across different sites:
From an IT side of things, it is easier to manage
because you don’t have to update the machine every
time there is an update to Windows, or an application.
It’s all done centrally. So, from an IT perspective it
is easier to update and proceed. Also, for security. I
mean when we got the cyberattack [May 2017], we
got affected really badly. And so, all the security is
managed on the server side, so it can’t get infected
on the individual machine. So, there’s a lot of factors
in there. [ICT Service Delivery Manager]
In this new VDI environment, Skype needed to be installed
centrally on individual staff members’ user profiles, as opposed
to manually on specific computers. The clinical teams affected
were assured that Skype would still be accessible through their
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personal VDI, and arrangements were put in place to install the
application onto relevant staff VDI profiles.
By September 2017, VDI had been deployed across two hospital
sites covering 2000 users. Only one non-VDI PC remained
within the Diabetes center where TW was based. When she first
logged onto her VDI profile, she was relieved to find Skype
still available on her desktop. For two months, she continued
to run video appointments as part of her weekly clinic, which
constituted 10-20% of her follow-up appointment activity.
However, in November 2017, she started to experience a
problem where her Skype contact list would completely
disappear. It was as if her Skype account had been completely
wiped, which made it impossible to run video consultations, as
both parties need to be established contacts. The history of all
Skype interactions with that patient (including text messaging,
contact requests, and missed calls) also disappeared.
As Skype appeared to work normally on the one remaining
standalone PC, TW attributed the problem to VDI deployment.
She emailed the ICT helpdesk seeking urgent assistance, anxious
to retrieve her contact list before her next set of appointments.
The ICT Service Desk Manager (after discussing with the
Network team) concluded that Skype would not work on VDI
and advised TW to continue running video appointments using
the one remaining PC. However, this was not a realistic option,
since TW did not have the authority to use a specific room:
Clinic rooms are not yours. You only use the one room
allocated to you. Someone else might be using it.
[TW]
She escalated the issue, emailing the ICT manager (anonymized
as GF) along with other senior members on the TST program,
emphasizing the “serious clinical risk” of this problem and
implication for their plans to scale up the use of virtual
consultations across the trust. The ICT manager recognized the
problem and assured TW that efforts were being made to get
Skype working on the VDI.
Through December 2017 and January 2018, various members
of the ICT team became involved in addressing the issue. As a
temporary workaround, they set up a User Acceptance Testing
(UAT) pool on TW’s VDI profile, from which she was asked
to run Skype. The UAT pool is effectively a separate virtual
machine used to run tests and reconfigure settings without
impacting the wider live production VDI environment. Such
pools had also been developed for other applications that were
either new or posed problems for the VDI environment.
This period was a “constant irritation” for TW. Determined to
keep her video clinic running, she continued to have video
appointments with selected patients, while engineers sought to
test and troubleshoot different ways of synchronizing her local
Skype application with her central account. At times they
managed to retrieve the contact list. However, often, it would
disappear when she rebooted the machine, requiring further
assistance through the ICT helpdesk.
As time went on, TW made sure this remained a priority issue
on the Transforming Services Together agenda, raising it at
meetings and sending group emails to various ICT and strategic
actors. The ICT team continued to investigate but could not
provide a clear idea of how or when it would be resolved.
By February 2018, one of the End User Computing engineers
(anonymized as OB) who had been tasked to lead on this issue
began to make some progress. By shadowing TW and reviewing
background operating processes while she used the Skype
application through her VDI profile, he identified that while
some of her contacts appeared on loading the application, many
did not. After some time, he worked out that the local machine
was saving a profile of any Skype contacts used. If the same
user logged in again on that machine, those contacts would be
found again, and this would prevent additional contacts from
the user’s wider Skype profile being copied across from
Microsoft Cloud. Having identified the problem, OB anticipated
that a fix could be found.
In February 2018, OB and other members of the ICT team
invited TW to their office to show her how to run the Skype
application from the UAT profile they had installed. OB
documented his fix in a Word document as a script for the
service support team to use in future cases. While TW was able
to return to using Skype more readily, she now had to relaunch
Skype every time she wanted to use it (to sync it with her online
account), and from a specific local drive on her UAT pool
(where the fix was implemented), rather than letting it run in
the background. She considered this clunky compromise
worthwhile to ensure the contact list remained intact and up to
date.
Unfortunately, this promising fix did not last long. After a few
months, TW’s contact list disappeared again. TW contacted
OB, who reimplemented his script, which rectified the issue.
Nevertheless, after a few weeks, the problem occurred again.
In the months that followed, it became a routine practice for
TW to call upon various ICT engineers whom she got to know,
asking them to reimplement OB’s script whenever the issue
occurred. This was frustrating and awkward, not least because
the Skype clinic ran from 8:45-9:30 am, but the ICT helpdesk
did not open until 9:00 am. During that time, TW purposefully
restricted the service to existing and familiar patients in the
hope that a more permanent solution would be found.
However, in August 2018, this issue was further confounded
by another problem. TW noticed that Skype was running
particularly slowly, and it also slowed down the other clinical
applications. Sometimes it ran so slowly that it was impossible
to use. On other occasions the application crashed altogether:
The whole thing would slow down. And that was
terrible because the patient would call in. And I could
see they were calling in. But I couldn’t even accept
the call because the whole thing was so slow. By the
time I got the cursor on the icon and click, the patient
would call off. So, it was just awful. They could see I
was online. They could see that I would have seen the
call. But I wasn’t picking up the call. And normally,
when that happens – because if I am talking to
another patient, I would type them a message to say
I’m busy I will reply in ten minutes. But in this case,
I wasn’t even able to do that. The whole thing was
terrible. Even if I was able to manage to connect.
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Everything was slow. I couldn’t open patient records.
[TW]
Consequently, TW and other members of her team stopped
running video appointments completely. TW and other members
of the rollout program were beginning to consider other
technology options (see subcase 1). However, this would take
time to establish. In the meantime, TW was asked to launch
Skype on her VDI profile every day for six weeks and keep logs
of her experience to try and develop a clearer picture of what
kept happening. Partly because the problem largely resolved
over the Christmas period (when network usage dropped), the
ICT team concluded that the Skype application used more
memory than had been anticipated and increased the central
processing unit (CPU) for TW’s UAT pool. While this appeared
to resolve the problem, TW considered this fix too precarious
to justify expanding the service to new patients or encouraging
other staff to use it. The fact that she was not under pressure to
push the pace of implementation illustrates that the project,
while formally Trust policy, was not an overriding priority.
A member of the ICT department summed up the prevailing
sense of confusion and impasse:
The challenge we have with VDI is lots of patchy fixes
and never really clear what exactly they have done
to fix it… And we have hundreds of applications that
we use across the trust. And this will be happening
with lots of other programmes. … It is very very
difficult to isolate what is happening. A lot of it is
feeling around in the dark as to what may or may not
be happening. Even when you get an answer, it will
change tomorrow… [ICT Project Manager]
At the time of writing, the trust, and the IT support team are
still struggling with the challenges of VDI technology. A
reviewer of a previous draft of this paper suggested that the kind
of technical analysis described in this case could have been done
in a more automated way using situated analytics had the IT
department been aware of such approaches [44], though these
may well bring their own challenges.
This case illustrates how even in digital-exemplar health care
organizations, breakdowns are frequent, and repairs are not
merely technological but also social and political. The clinical
entrepreneur (TW) achieves repairs by using her status and
relationships within the organization to mobilize the ICT support
infrastructure and persuade support staff to agree to bespoke
solutions (eg, allowing the use of the legacy desktop machine
to run Skype). In other cases, lower-status junior doctors and
nursing staff had less power and influence in this regard, and
in that sense, carried a heavier infrastructural burden (ie, their
work was more vulnerable to constraints and delays when
breakdowns occurred). Such staff were, for example, dependent
on a response from the generic IT helpdesk support email
address (because they either lacked the seniority to contact
anyone else directly, or lacked knowledge of whom to speak
to), and progress tended to be slow unless the problem could
be escalated to someone with better connections.
Video Call Quality in a Peripheral Hospital
This subcase relates to a rheumatology clinic in one of the
peripheral hospitals of Petroc Health (anonymized as Eastern
General). It illustrates the patchworked and incrementally fixed
nature of health information infrastructure. Previously a separate,
small district general hospital 20 miles away on the outskirts
of London, Eastern General merged with the main Petroc Health
Trust in 2013. As this case illustrates, the distant site has become
swept up in the wider modernization effort of this digital
innovator organization, a perhaps typical experience for the
smaller and weaker partner in a merged organization. The
learning curve for the team at Eastern General is long and steep.
For the clinicians in the narrative, the goal is not merely to make
the video connection work technically but to ensure that it works
reliably and to a sufficient standard to support professional
work. Despite many time-consuming test calls to try to optimize
the technology, it fails on the day, and she, in turn, feels she
has failed her patients.
Eastern General was widely viewed as both clinically and
technologically backward by those in the main central London
site. In September 2017, CB, the physiotherapist, met with GT
(Service Delivery Manager) and LT (Patient Pathway
Coordinator) in the staff meeting room to test Skype on her
computer and familiarize herself with the application. Her first
video appointment was booked for the following week. After
spending some time tinkering (eg, finding USB ports that
worked, positioning webcam, setting the correct audio output
devices), navigating (eg, how to find contact, initiate calls, send
messages) and test calling (using the Skype test call audio
playback service), they got the technology to work.
After months of preparation, the team was excited to finally
launch their new video clinic, which was the first on this site.
For six months, GT had worked with the local Service Manager
(FI) to get everything in place. Among other things, they had
to submit requests to the ICT department to incorporate video
appointment slots into CB’s electronic scheduling tool, generate
new appointment letters, and gain access to the Skype
application on the clinic desktop computer (the peripheral
hospital was yet to be modernized with VDI technology).
On the morning of the first video clinic, CB arrived at work
earlier than usual. She needed to collect the webcam and headset
from the administrative office, load up Skype, and check it was
working on the clinic computer. The one video appointment
was deliberately scheduled to take place at the end of her clinic
so as not disrupt her face-to-face appointments. When that time
came, Skype was slow to respond. When the patient answered
CB’s call, his face was severely pixelated. At times, the video
froze or dropped altogether. The audio was also broken and
distorted. Clinician and patient struggled on, but only by
disabling the video function at both ends.
CB did not want a repeat of this challenging and embarrassing
situation. She decided to run some more test calls before the
following week’s clinic. She wanted to know if this was a
one-off glitch or a problem with the hospital connection that
was likely to be recurrent; she strongly suspected the latter.
Over the next few days, she found time to perform test calls
(with colleagues and members of the implementation team)
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from the consultation room, with variable and inconclusive
results. She would have liked to have done more tests, but time
was limited because the consultation room was rarely free to
use, and she needed to fit in with the availability of the person
on the other end. The following Tuesday, she ran another video
appointment with a patient. This one was just as bad. She
decided to discontinue video appointment bookings until she
could trust the technology.
And I guess it’s frustrating because you are messing
around for a few minutes and it doesn’t look very
professional for the patient, where I’m having to hang
up the call and pick up the call again, and say why
can’t I see them. [CB]
FG (Service Manager) escalated the problem with the ICT
manager (GF), who passed it to the program lead responsible
for supporting the roll-out of video clinics (BN). For the ICT
team, this was not a simple technical fix. There appeared to be
no objective way of assessing bandwidth requirements; they
could only “suck it and see.” Video streaming was a new
demand on Eastern General’s overstretched network, which had
been designed historically for much lighter information traffic
but had recently become (organizationally and technically) part
of the digital innovator Petroc Health. Various attempts to
modernize Eastern General by installing new technologies had
not gone well:
Eastern General has a very – a network under
pressure. It’s organically grown to support the service
but not necessarily with the nuts and bolts required
on the network. So what we have is a lot of people
hanging off the network more than what it can
manage. […] People are competing for the bandwidth
that’s there […]. What you’ll get is limited bandwidth
at different locations depending on the size of the
fibres that have been put in, or the connections that
have been put in. […] [T]hat bit of spaghetti may
have been a 10 meg link. Whereas some people had,
I don’t know, linguini which was the fatter one, and
that’s a 100 meg link. And then you sit on a much
bigger pipe which is the fibre. So if you sit there,
you’ve got a weaker link. [ICT Support Manager]
The above quote illustrates how the clinicians, patients,
managers, and relevant ICT people, along with elements of the
technical network, have all been enrolled into an effort to get a
new, video-based rheumatology service up and running at
Eastern General, but the known limits on capacity in this
historically low-tech site were somehow not factored into the
planning. Batteau [45] has pointed out:
Heterogeneity of expectations, artifacts,
infrastructure, support, skills, management, and
system planning … is an inevitable consequence of
the variable rates of diffusion [of innovations] in a
large-scale technological system within an articulated
social field.
The task is to rise to the challenges that are posed by such
inescapably complex relations and processes.
CB continued to try test calls when she could, to gain a better
idea of how the video call quality varied. On one occasion, this
was done with an ICT engineer present, who went on to speak
with the server team to ascertain how call quality corresponded
with wider network usage. Despite initial plans to run these
tests more frequently, in practice, it was too difficult to organize
and coordinate them alongside the availability of the clinic
room.
With limited data and multiple interacting influences (eg,
variations in network capacity and traffic within different
sections, and at different times, across the network, and the CPU
demand of Skype and other systems running on the local
terminal), it was difficult for the ICT department to confidently
establish the underlying cause of the problem. GF decided to
postpone any further deployments of video consultation
technology at Eastern General. The hospital was due to have
two major IT upgrades within the year, so it made sense to wait
before progressing with the video clinics. The ICT support
manager was upbeat about this:
In the next six months they will have a whole new
network and their Skype will be singing and dancing.
Because effectively we are giving them a motorway
in terms of provision of bandwidth.
For the ICT team, their experience at Eastern General
highlighted the value of what they referred to as a “controlled
rollout.” This involved working with a few services, each
running a small number of consultations, to understand how
Skype impacts the network and manage or restrict activity where
necessary.
For CB and her team, it was felt that some momentum still
needed to be maintained for their new virtual clinic service. CB
believed video quality was far better during her Friday morning
clinic than the Tuesday clinic, perhaps due to less demand on
the network at this time. She asked GT to prepare and submit
another clinic template change form to incorporate video slots
into her Friday clinic.
By November 2017 (which was before the two major upgrades),
the new (Friday) video slots had been implemented, and CB
began offering video appointments. On 30 November, she ran
two successful video appointments. The video quality, though
not perfect, was enough to run the consultation. In the
knowledge that the Eastern General network will be improved
at some point, she has continued to press ahead cautiously with
Skype in a small number of carefully selected patients.
CB’s frustration reflects several features of what we have
previously (following MacIntyre) called medicine’s internal
goods [46]: being available for the patient (as a professional
standard, the risk of not being available must be zero), assuring
continuity of care (rheumatology patients generally have lifelong
conditions and stay with their specialist clinician for years), and
providing professional presence (via a technically adequate
video connection). Given that the unreliable connection
jeopardized all these internal goods, it was small wonder that
the clinician felt that “it doesn’t look very professional.”
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Access Rights to Use Video Conferencing Software
Our final subcase highlights how the embeddedness of
infrastructure in local systems poses challenges to spreading a
technology-supported service model to other organizations.
Adoption required distributed reconfigurations across multiple
levels of practice, which were reciprocal and interlocking. The
technical infrastructure (including a licensed Skype technology
acquired through a previous purchasing decision) afforded and
constrained actions in ways that played out differently to the
main case site, in which particular organizational routines,
processes, knowledge, standards, and workarounds had emerged.
In this last case, information governance concerns and standards
constrained technological choices and slowed the
implementation of solutions.
Southern Trust, a large, multi-site provider in a university city
that had won awards as a digital innovator, was supported by
the Video Consultation Unit at Petroc Health to try to introduce
video consultations in various clinical services. One of these
was a sarcoma (bone and soft tissue tumor) clinic, where a
consultant surgeon, SB, led the implementation. After signing
up, implementation was put on hold for several months due to
a significant increase in clinic demand alongside senior staff
changes and recruitment delays.
In April 2018, after SB was able to secure some additional
operational staff time, progress was made to set up the
technology. Skype for Business had been part of a recent NHS
Mail integration, so it was available free to all staff users. This
platform offered similar management and security functionality
as Adobe Connect, but also interfaced with Skype and allowed
people without an account to join as guests, avoiding the need
to set up patient accounts. The additional call encryption
capabilities and integration with NHS Mail (secure email
accounts for NHS staff) were also considered an advantage over
the consumer version of Skype, which had not been designed
with the privacy needs of medical consultations in mind.
By September 2018, Skype for Business was installed on a
dedicated laptop (specifically purchased for running video
appointments), to be held by an administrator and taken to the
clinic by SB. This was because most clinic computers used VDI
profiles, and there were uncertainties about the reliability of
Skype on these (reinforced by the experiences at Petroc). Use
of the laptop required governance approvals with the recently
introduced Data Protection Impact Assessment tool to comply
with the UK’s General Data Protection Regulations.
SB identified some suitable patients to run his first video
appointments but wanted to run dummy calls and familiarize
himself with the technology before booking them in. However,
his series of attempts to test the technology repeatedly failed.
The application was on his desktop, but he could not get past
the login page, as it had not been configured to his account. A
Helpdesk request to IT resulted in him being able to sign in and
contact colleagues. However, when he tried to call members of
the Petroc team supporting him, he was confronted with a
generic pop-up error message to “contact operational support
for further information.”
After unsuccessfully calling ICT support, he stopped the tests.
The operational support manager was tasked with finding
someone in ICT to help:
[W]e’ve had to sort of drive and chase every, sort of,
step…. At the moment the IT is the stumbling block…
Our managers are running around with their own
priorities and I don’t know who will practically help
us… You just don’t feel – it hasn’t been allocated to
anyone… Our IT requests just go to a generic call
desk.
With no response to email requests and continuing demand on
the clinic team, progress on developing the virtual consultation
service stalled. After two months of chasing, a member of the
ICT team investigated the issue. It emerged that, while Skype
for Business was available as part of the NHS Mail integration,
the default configuration was for internal communications.
External communication required additional enterprise licenses,
of which the trust had a limited number.
After some weeks, the application on SB’s clinic laptop was
successfully configured to enable external video calls. SB
managed to run some dummy calls, followed by a single video
consultation with a carefully selected patient, which went well.
Based on his experience over the last 18 months, he remained
concerned about the reliability of the technology and routine
use within this busy clinic.
Similar challenges confronted other services at Southern Health.
One clinician resorted to purchasing an iPad and using Facetime
(with patients who owned Apple devices), thus bypassing the
NHS technical infrastructure. All teams expressed a pessimistic
outlook on the prospect of routinely running video appointments.
While there was no active resistance to using the technology,
there was perceived to be an absence of senior-level engagement
and leadership:
The technology is there. It is ready and waiting. But
we need someone to drive it as their own priority
getting these clinics up and running and looking at
the various technical issues that come with it… and
ironing those out. [Physiotherapist]
The subcase illustrates a key finding: that the contingent and
emergent qualities of infrastructure mean that it will never be
possible to develop a standard pathway to implementation.
While support from Petroc Health played an important role, this
could not make virtual consultations happen locally. Indeed,
this example illustrated that spreading the model to other sites
needs to center on the process of translation in the new site,
which will never be fully scripted by generic models and
implementation guides.
Discussion
Main Findings
This paper has described four detailed subcases within a wider
case study of scaling up video consultation services in a
multi-site London hospital trust and spreading this model to
other UK sites. The subcases illustrate how “boring things”
(such as internal procedures, locally-endorsed standards, aspects
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of software functionality, mundane administrative issues such
as room bookings, general pressures on the system,
cash-constrained departments fighting their corner, and historical
decisions to invest in particular platforms) influenced the
fortunes of a technological innovation. Infrastructural challenges
included intricacy and lack of dependability of the installed
base; interdependencies of technologies, processes, and routines,
such that a fix for one problem generated problems elsewhere
in the system; the inertia of established routines; the constraining
effect of budgets and legacy systems; and delays and conflicts
relating to regulatory and professional standards, especially
around clinical quality and safety.
Our rich ethnographic data revealed the importance of
entrepreneurial clinicians, who were committed to introducing
new technology to deliver excellent care and who made
persistent and creative efforts to interest, enroll, and mobilize
others to help align technologies, standards, routines, and
processes in the pursuit of that goal. Despite these efforts, and
notwithstanding, prevailing, master-narratives of efficiency,
standardization, and control, the health information
infrastructure in Petroc Health, in particular, was revealed as
heterogeneous and unstable, with the various elements pulling
apart (drift) and an absence of effective central control
(distribution), resulting in what Berg [47] has called:
A fragile, never static equilibrium, characterized by
never ending frictions, loose ends, and unforeseen
consequences.
Our findings affirmed previous research, which showed that
when video consultations work, they can be clinically
high-quality and safe. However, for this eventuality to be
achieved, the physical (material) and knowledge-practice
(nonmaterial) conditions of possibility must be adequate. When
(and to the extent that) these infrastructural preconditions are
inadequate (eg, when technical breakdown precludes or
compromises a video consultation), the purposive interactions
of clinical care become awkward and risky. The clinician’s lack
of trust in the reliability of the infrastructure is accompanied by
a constant undercurrent of anxiety about being unable to care
for patients to appropriate standards. As one reviewer
commented, “we seem to have created a new form of
professional shame.”
To the extent that the precarious infrastructure that characterized
our study sites was able to support the innovation and maintain
excellence in clinical care, this was in no small part due to
creative and persistent work undertaken by individual human
actors to bridge, through human and technical workarounds,
the gap between standardization and contingency. This
articulation work was never-ending; it often had a political
component; and it sometimes succeeded only to the extent that
the innovation remained confined to a local setting, protected
from the wider system. In some cases, the gap between
standardization and contingency could never be bridged (eg,
when administrative permissions to use a technology were not
forthcoming or when internet connectivity proved rate-limiting),
resulting in suspension or abandonment of the project.
Strengths and Limitations
This study has both empirical and theoretical strengths.
Empirically, it is based on extensive ethnographic fieldwork
conducted over many years and oriented to explore the
contingent and emergent qualities of health care infrastructure.
The study’s theoretical strength is the extension of Star’s
foundational work on infrastructure to include a central emphasis
on its institutional elements. We have combined different but
related theoretical perspectives, namely, strong structuration
theory, neo-institutional theory, social practice theory, and
aspects of actor-network theory, and applied these to a rich,
longitudinal dataset to tease out how the institutional aspects
of information infrastructures emerge and unfold over time.
The limitations of this study include the question of how far we
can generalize from a single, unique case to make claims about
infrastructure more generally. The five defining components of
health information infrastructure set out in the introduction were
built on, refined, and developed to explain our empirical data;
they may not explain all aspects of such infrastructure in all
contexts. We encourage others to apply and extend our
theoretical framework to contrasting countries and settings.
Comparison With Previous Literature
Our work resonates strongly with Star’s original theoretical
work on information infrastructure [1,2], as well as that of other
founding scholars who have taken a social practice perspective
on technology [6,17,24,47].
Hartswood et al, drawing on various ethnographic studies of
health information systems in the United Kingdom, introduced
the notion of “design in use,” in which design is
reconceptualized from a discrete phase that occurs before the
technology is implemented to a never-ending effort to achieve
and maintain embedding by coadapting the technology and the
work processes it aims to support. Facilitated partnerships
between ICT specialists and clinician-users are needed to
address [48]:
…the ongoing struggle of making this particular
system work for these particular users, in this
particular workplace and at this particular time.
These authors emphasize the importance of making ICT work
more visible to nontechnical users, allowing them to take a more
informed leadership role, and, conversely, how making clinical
work visible to ICT specialists allows the latter to become
attuned to the nuances of technology use, thereby understanding
the importance (or not) of particular features or adaptations.
Grisot et al describe a 10-year ethnography of the design,
development, and initial use of a web-based solution for
patient-hospital communication at a Norwegian hospital [6].
Like the solutions in our case studies, this began as a bottom-up
initiative from a small and motivated team, though in the
Norwegian case, the entrepreneurs were ICT, not clinical, staff.
Numerous challenges and setbacks are described, but overall,
the solution grew gradually and in a locally adaptive way as the
ICT team assessed and addressed specific user needs and use
cases. The authors conclude that ICT innovations that are part
of the infrastructure cannot merely be “installed.” Instead, they
must be organically “cultivated” in a way that acknowledges
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changing organizational needs and the inertia and constraints
of the installed base [6]. Maniatopoulos et al had similar findings
when studying the spread of new diagnostic technology for
breast cancer across NHS oncology and pathology units. They
concluded that [24]:
It is difficult - if not impossible - to propose a
standard pathway for its [lymph node biopsy
technology’s] embedding into healthcare practice.
These findings from other research groups mirror our own in
highlighting the need to create spaces in which generic elements
of solutions can be adapted to local needs and circumstances.
However, they differ in that, in our case study, there was a
tendency for clinical and informatics staff to talk past one
another, with the former (at least to some extent) failing to fully
appreciate the technical elements of infrastructure and the latter
not fully appreciating the clinical (eg, quality and safety) aspects.
This highlights the need to positively promote shared interests
and mutual comprehension between the different groups
essential to processes of implementation. The scaling-up
program for video consultations is, however, at an early stage
in its evolution, and there is scope for introducing additional
measures to support design-in-use and emergent cultivation.
However, this would require, at the very least, attention to the
severe staffing shortages that underlie long response times in
some participating sites.
The Institutional Elements of Infrastructure
The UK National Health Service was established in 1947 and
remains a cherished national institution among both
professionals and the public [49]. Using Scott’s taxonomy [28],
the institutional pillars which support the NHS are threefold:
formal (including legal) regulations, enduring professional
values and codes of conduct, and expected patterns of behavior.
Our data revealed that all three pillars are retained and
consolidated in the technical elements of NHS information
infrastructure as well as in the habitus of NHS staff. This was
evident in the nonnegotiable way that rules and regulations
(regarding privacy and data protection) were imposed, often in
a way that could not be materially overridden, in clinicians’
commitment to providing a “professional” service and the
lengths to which they were prepared to go to prevent
“embarrassing” violations of the standards they set themselves,
and in the long-established patterns of action and interaction
that delivered traditional outpatient services. It is for these
institutional reasons, of legitimacy and support, and not merely
for technical connectivity issues, that the information
infrastructure of the NHS has proved so hard to change and why
the implementation of new infrastructure often plays out in
political ways (eg, as battles between clinical departments, ICT
departments, and top management).
UK policy on health technology is currently placing considerable
emphasis on light IT innovations such as apps and devices,
which are presented as having the potential to improve the
quality and efficiency of care. For example, the NHS Innovation
Accelerator was established in 2015 [50]:
To speed up adoption of innovations which have
proven potential for high impact throughout the NHS
and wider healthcare economy.
Such an approach, which places limited emphasis on cultivating
the underlying infrastructure with which such novel technologies
will need to connect, is deterministic and naïve. Critics have,
for example, condemned the new “doctor-in-your-pocket”
smartphone video consultation service mentioned in the
introduction [11] as both unsafe (because the symptom-checker
app is alleged to be unreliable) and unethical (because the
service is marketed to young adults, allegedly taking this group
and leaving the NHS to care for older and sicker individuals)
[51,52]. While a full analysis of this particular controversy is
beyond the scope of this paper, the question arises as to whether
this controversial service has succeeded precisely because it is
not merely technology-light but also regulation-light and
value-light. In other words, it has been designed to bypass,
rather than integrate with, the institutionalized infrastructure of
the NHS.
The challenge of spreading technological innovation through a
national public health care system raises the question of how
to balance (on the one hand) providing a high degree of stability
and commonality through typified inbuilt models, categories,
and processes, and (on the other hand) providing sufficient
leeway for flexibility to accommodate local contexts (including
clinical and geographical particularities, historical path
dependencies, and local political agendas) and also allowing
the clinician to exercise the necessary autonomy during the
consultation. Ellingsen and Monterio observe that “extensive
local adaption does not scale, resulting in constraints stemming
from one local setting spilling over to the next” [53]. Either we
must abandon completely the vision of scaling up innovations
that have worked in one setting, or we need to rephrase the
scale-up challenge in a more nuanced way, for example: how
can we build leeway into technologies to maximize scope for
adaptation to different local infrastructures and (at the point of
technology use) clinical microcontexts?
Conclusion
This paper has revisited Star’s classic work on information
infrastructure, has developed its theoretical underpinnings
particularly concerning institutional influences and has used a
contemporary case study to illustrate its continued relevance to
the challenges of medical and health informatics. In a 2001
review paper, Orlikowski and Iacono showed that most
information system research published at the time had treated
technologies in isolation (eg, as tools), while only a small
fraction had studied them as ensembles, that is, as part of wider
socio-technical systems [54]. We have recently produced similar
findings in a health care context (Papoutsi et al, paper
submitted). The empirical findings presented in this paper
emphasize the importance of an ensemble view of technologies
and show how, particularly in a public-sector health care setting,
that ensemble incorporates and reproduces institutional rules,
norms, and ways of working.
These findings suggest that much could be learned from further
ethnographic studies of health information infrastructure in
different contexts. While the popular randomized trial design
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has its place, it tends to reinforce a tool rather than ensemble
view of technology and downplay the importance of
infrastructure. A case study design is needed to illustrate, for
example, how newly introduced technology is initially equivocal
[55]. However, through much local negotiation, interpretation,
and on-the-job support can become both technologically and
institutionally stabilized [56].
Our findings also suggest that innovators and change agents
who wish to introduce new technologies in health services and
systems could distill some working principles from our
retheorization of infrastructure. First, it is essential to attend to
materiality, such as to expect bugs and breakdowns and
prioritize basic dependability over advanced functionality.
Second, the technological artifact should be considered
relationally and as part of a system, rather than as an isolated
tool or function. Third, it should be remembered that
technology-supported work is cooperative and embedded in
organizational routines, and that clinical routines are embedded,
sometimes inextricably, in other clinical and administrative
routines. Fourth, innovation should generally occur
incrementally and organically, with careful attention to
technological and socio-cultural legacies. Finally, the
institutional nature of infrastructure suggests that it is important
to attend not just to standards but to where these standards come
from, whose priorities and interests they represent, and whether
there is sufficient leeway for them to be appropriately adapted
to different local conditions.
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